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Many countries consider the profits of public manufacturing 
enterprises from two separate points of view. The first concerns the 
validity of profit making and the uses to which profit should be pub. 
The second concerns the appropriateness of regarding profitability as a 
measure - or as one possible measure - of operational efficiency. 
Official policies on profitability show extremely wide variations 
from one country to another. In a study conducted recently by UNIDO 
many of the participating countries reported that their manufacturing 
public enterprises are not required to show a profit on their operations, 
although they do not always make clear precisely why they regard 
profit-making with comparative indifference. Iran, fàr example, emphasizes 
the importance she attaches to price stabilization, which may be incompatible 
with profitability and inevitably so if the general economic situation 
is characterized by inflation. Sudan says that "self-sufficiency" is the 
fundamental aim of her industrial policy, which means that profit-making, 
although not the "ultimate goal", is certainly not ruled out as a 
subsidiary one. Argentina, in saying that profit-making is not a "basic 
requirement", likewise suggests that profits nay be by no means unwelcome. . 
Of the other countries reporting, France states her policy most 
clearly on this subject. Profits in French public manufacturing enterprises, 
are the result of efficiency in production for a competitive market, and 
are normally required of them for the financing of expansion, Sweden 
reports that long-run profit maximization is the goal of her public 
manufacturing enterprises that operate under competitive conditions. 
Italy follows the criterion of "economicità", requiring her enterprises to 
remunerate at current rates of interest that portion of their capital which 
is raised from a competitive market. (The enterprises' "endowment funds", 
however, are rarely so remunerated "because of the costs the managing 
agencies have to stand in pursuing public objectives".) In Turkey, fcy Law 440, 
profitability is declared "essential"; in Iraq, it is normally fixed at 10 per 
cent "of the total cost of the products"; in Ceylon it is "required" and in 
Ghana "expected". India, under her Five-Year Plans, expects public 
manufacturing enterprises to yield, in toto, a given sum (e.g. Rs.4,500 million 
during the Third Five-Year Plan) towards the capital resources required for 
plan fulfilment. ^ variety 
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The variety of attitudes thus illustrated is by no means an entirely 
random one. It reflects, for instance, a distinction between the developed 
"mixed" economy countries and the less developed ones. In France, Italy and 
Sweden, public manufacturing enterprises are subject to the "discipline" of 
competition; their profitability, therefore, is not only expected but taken 
as at least a rough-and ready measure of their efficiency. Elsewhere, 
competitive conditions are either non-existent or extremely imperfect, 
particularly in those lines of production in which public manufacturing 
enterprises tend to specialize; profitability, therefore, is neither 
correlated with efficiency nor regarded as a means of measuring it. Where 
expected, it is deliberately planned for as a means of providing 
self-generated resources for enterprise expansion and re-equipment or as 
a contribution to general capital-formation in the total national economy. 
There is also a very broad and imperfect distinction between those 
countries which have extensive systems of public manufacturing enterprises 
and those which, either because they rely more heavily on the private 
sector or because their industrial development is still in its early 
stages, have comparatively limited ones. The former group, which includes 
India and Turkey, necessarily regard the generation of surpluses by their 
enterprises as an important engine of economic growth; the latter place 
less emphasis on this objective. In Greece, for instance, surpluses 
accruing from the operations of public manufacturing enterprises can 
hardly be more than marginal in their effect on the total economy, 
while for Sudan the inure diate objective is the initial establishment 
of enterprises v/hich can lead to greater industrial self-sufficiency, 
irrespective of their profitability, at least in the short term, 
Where profit is not the more-or-less automatic result of success in 
competition, it has to be planned for, by the enterprise itself or by the 
public authorities or by both, through a process of consultation and 
collaboration. Here, again, practices differ, depending, at least, partly 
on the extent to vihich the profits of the enterprises enter as important 
elements into the resource-calculations made for the national economic plan. 
Only Ghana, where "financial planning is very elementary", whether at the 
enterprise level or the national level, reports that there are virtually no 
profit-targets. In Argentina, Ceylon, Iran and Sudan, the targeting is 
undertaken by the enterprises themselves. , 
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Iraq has the rather curious system by which one group of enterprises 
(i.e. those directly under the control of the government) have their 
profit-targets set by the national plan, while another group (i.e. those 
dependent on the "holding company" known as the State Organization for 
Industry) set their own. However, the distinction between the two different 
kinds of arrangement for profit-targeting should not be very strongly 
emphasized, for it must be remembered that, to a considerable extent, 
expected profitability is closely related to investment and pricing 
policies, in respect of which the enterprise is rarely if ever endowed 
with autonomy. Hence, even then the enterprise is left free to plan for 
the realization of a particular level of profit, it does so within 
economic parameters stringently determined or at least powerfully 
influenced by the public authorities. 
India is one of the few countries where the government concerns itself 
most seriously with the profits that its public manufacturing enterprises 
are expected to realize. "Die Third Plan, sets an over-all target of 
Rs.4,500 million, while the Fourth Plan - which is at present in the course 
of reformulation - specified that enterprises should aim at a rate of 
return of 11-12 per cent per annum on their capital. According to the 
Indian rapporteur to the questionnaire, these targets have been fixed too 
generally, too arbitrarily, and without sufficient consultation with the 
enterprises themselves. This has led the Indian Committee on Public 
Undertakings (which is an evaluatory body comparable in function with 
the British Select Committee on Nationalized Industries) to make the 
following observations: 
"The Committee regret the manner in which the assessment of surpluses 
from the public undertakings has been made for the Third Five-Year 
Plan Ad hoc assessment of surpluses is unfortunate as it raises hopes 
which cannot be fulfilled and exposes the undertakings to public 
criticism. The Committee trust that while making provision in the 
Fourth and subsequent Plans the estimates of surpluses from public 
undertakings would be made on a realistic basis and in consultation 
with them." 
fit would 
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It would seem that an overall target for the profits to be realized 
by public enterprises is not very meaningful unless it represents an 
aggregate or average of the individual targets for each of the enterprises, 
which can be realistically formulated only by a process of close consultation 
with the managements of the enterprises themselves, who alone can say what 
is feasible and what is unfeasible in the conditions under which they are 
required to conduct their operations. 
It may be usefully added, for the sake of the record, that whereas 
certain countries appear to be little concerned with the profitability 
of their public manufacturing enterprises, and others - the majority -
expect them to make profits or hope that they will do so, none adopt, as 
a general rule, the so-called "break-even" policy. This policy was 
originally written into certain of the British "nationalization" laws, 
which required the newly-nationalized industries to bring into balance their 
receipts and expenditures on current account, "taking one year with another". 
An ambiguous and unenforceable injunction, it has been de facto abandoned 
even in the country of its origin, and there are now few who would seriously 
recommend its general adoption, particularly for public manufacturing 
industries - although it may have its merits, in particular circumstances, 
for public utilities. Of the reporting countries, only Greece suggests 
that her enterprises normally operate on the break-even principle; she 
does not, however, say that they are required to do so, nor that 
breaking-even has any particular virtue, except as a financial out-turn 
which is regarded as preferable to the making of a loss. 
When losses are registered by public manufacturing enterprises, they 
may be covered by a great variety of methods; straightforward subsidization 
from national budgetary funds; the granting of a loan, sometimes interest-free 
the waiver of service charges on outstanding loans or the declaration of a 
moratorium on loan repayments; the use of the enterprise's own reserves; 
the raiding of its depreciation funds. It is impossible to say, except in 
relation to particular circumstances, which of these methods is to be 
regarded as superior to others. There are, however, certain principles 
which may be recommended with some confidence. 
/Much depends 
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Mich depends on the precise reason for the loss. In some cases, 
it is the result of deliberate government policy. For social or 
political reasons, the government may have refused the enterprise 
permission to charge prices that will enable it to cover its costs of 
production, or have imposed upon it loss-making obligations which 
"put it in the red " in respect of the totality of its operations. 
In such cases, open subsidization, however arranged, is invariably the 
best method of covering the loss. Such subsidization, however, needs to 
be calculated with great care, since an enterprise (and sometimes the 
government itself) may be under strong temptation to attribute to 
extraneous factors losses which are in fact the result of managerial 
inefficiency. 
We would, therefore, suggest that the circumstances under which 
subsidization may be legitimately employed and the techniques that may be 
used for the calculation of its amount are subjects which ought to receive, 
careful attention. 
If an enterprise is expected to pay its way, but fails to do so for 
reasons unconnected with any directives it may have received from the 
government, then the use of the grant or even of the interest-free loan 
is normally an inappropriate method of covering its losses. One must, 
of course, make due allowance for the enterprises with a lengthy 
maturation period, which may have been allocated to the public sector 
precisely for the reasons that, during its first year of operation, it 
will inevitably be loss-making. A large number of public manufacturing 
enterprises initiated by the less developed countries do indeed fall 
within this category, and proper financial provision has therefore to be 
made for their "running-in" period. If the project analysis has been 
adequately done, however, the expected yield on invested capital is no 
more than delayed. The enterprise, therefore, is entitled to a moratorium 
on rather than a waiver of the financial obligations it would normally incur. 
Hence the appropriate way of covering losses is to make a loan on which 
interest-payments and amortization instalments are deferred for a number 
of years. Admittedly, this is a counsel of perfection, and it may well 
be that circumstances will compel the government eventually to write off 
/the charges 
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the charges, as a result of the inability of the enterprise to meet them, 
and thus in fact convert the loan into a grant. It may be - as has been 
the case with some of the British nationalized industries - that some 
portion of the enterprise's original capital will have to be written off. 
But these are measures to be used only in the last resort, when all else 
has failed; for if the enterprise starts its life in the expectation 
that a solicitous government will provide it with "easy" money to cover 
any losses it may incur, its. incentives to improve its efficiency and 
to achieve profitability will be reduced to a very low level. 
The raiding of depreciation funds is also a loss-covering device 
not to be recommended, except as a strictly temporary measure; for if it 
is continuously resorted to, the financial affairs to the enterprise will 
become more and more confused, and eventually its soundness as a commercial 
entity completely undermined. The use of reserve, however, falls into a 
different category, since the covering of temporary losses is one of the 
purposes for which the accumulation of reserve is intended. 
In the developed countries, such as France, losses are normally met 
in this way, with the exception of those which arise from the slow 
maturing of a project or from the need for its radical reconstruction. 
But it is obvious that reserves have to be created before they can be used, 
and the ability of an enterprise to have recourse to this method is in 
Itself evidence that it has already achieved a considerable financial 
success. 
When an enterprise makes a net profit, the question of its 
disposition arises. In Iraq, for instance, the manufacturing enterprises 
under the control of the State Organization for Industry (SOI) are required 
to operate the following scheme: 
"After deducting 25 per cent of the net profit of the enterprise for 
expansion purposes, the balance will be taxable, if it exceeds the 
yearly allowance for the first ten years of its profitable operation. 
After deducting the income tax, the remaining balance of the net 
profit, which is called 'ready-for-distribution' profit, has to be . 
distributed according to the law as follows: 
'/(I) 25 
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(1) 25 per cent... is allocated to the employees (management 
and workers)... as follows: 
(a) 10 percent... in cash..., according to the number of 
their working days and the income they received during 
the year the profit was realized, on the basis of 50 per 
cent for the working days... and 50 per cent for the 
income received...; 
(b) 5 per cent... to the social service and housing projects 
for the employees of the enterprise; 
(c) 10 per cent... to the central and common social service 
and housing projects... of the SOI companies. 
(2) The remaining 25 per cent of the... "ready-for-distribution" 
profit has to be tramferred to the SOI headquarters to be 
distributed as follows: 
(a) An interest of 3 per cent on the bonds :held by the 
ex-shareholders of the nationalized companies; 
(b) Of the remaining balance - (i) 30 per cent to the redemption 
of those bonds; (ii) 30 per cent to the national budget; 
and (iii) the remaining 40 per cent to the expansion of 
the SOI's existing projects or to the establishment of 
new projects". 
Such.a scheme (some of the complexities of which are inherent in the 
"two-tier" structure of the SOI Group) has certain manifest advantages. 
There is no doubt about the manner in which profits are to be distributed, 
and consequently their purely "political" use is ruled out, so long as 
government and management treat the law with respect. In particular, the 
government is inhibited from using its successful public manufacturing 
enterprises as sources for the replenishment of its general revenues, 
except to the extent that their profits are subject to taxation. 
Furthermore, both managers and workers are given - or appear to be given -
incentives to the achievement of greater efficiency and higher productivity. 
On the other hand, the scheme would seem to have a degree of rigidity which 
might well prove difficult to reconcile either with coherent national economic 
/planning or 
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planning or with the periodical adjustment of the distribution of 
investment resources made necessary by changing economic circumstances. 
One might suggest, therefore, that the scheme's actual operation will need 
to be studied carefully in order to judge whether it does not unduly tie 
the hands of both governments and managements. 
At the other end of the scale is India, which has no "clear and specific' 
methods" for the distribution of the profits generated by its public 
manufacturing enterprises. In practice, most of the enterprises "have been 
ploughing back their profits in the form of various reserves, e.g. general 
reserve, development rebate reserve, etc.", as following figures, relating 
to the distribution of a net profit of Rs.299.4 million generated by 
43 central government concerns in the year 1966-67, clearly show: 
224.8 
Appropriation Rs. million 
(1) Central and other Reserves 155.3 
(2) Development Rebate ..Reserve 72.6 
Less transfer from reserve 3«! 
(3) Dividends 
(i) for the year 1966-67 73.4 
(ii) for the previous year q r, 
74.1 
293.9 
Balance carried over 0.5 
299.4 
Such flexibility, of course, facilitates both the long-term planning 
and the short-term adjustment of the national economy; but it could be wide 
open to abuse, and does not embody any pattern of "incentives" that might 
guarantee rewards for managers and workers who make special efforts to 
achieve the targets they have been set. 
/other countries 
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Other countries without laws for the regulation of profit-distribution 
report varying practices. The Ghanaian public manufacturing enterprises, for 
instance, normally retain their profits but "sometimes" pay "some" of them 
into the Treasury. The Sudanese enterprises use their profits, apparently 
in accordance with a series of ad hoc decisions by the government, for 
repayment of capital, payment of dividends, and transfer to reserves. 
There is also a group of countries, that specify by law the distribution 
of certain portions of their enterprises' profits but leave the remainder to 
be used as the enterprise or the government sees fit. In some cases, the 
law confines itself to stating the principles upon which bonuses shall be 
allocated to managers and workers. In France, for instance, the Act of 
17 August 1967 on "Participation by Workers in Gains through Expansion" 
obliges enterprises with more than one hundred employees to pay their 
employees a sum calculated in the following way: 
"The company tax plus an additional 5 per cent, representing the 
return on the capital invested by the enterprise itself in France, 
are deducted from the taxable profit. Then the adjusted profit is 
multiplied by a coefficient, equal to the ratio between 'wages and . 
salaries paid out and value added' and reflecting the share of • 
labour in the creative activity of the enterprise. Half of the 
amount calculated in this manner is distributed among the employees 
in proportion to their salaries (but it may not exceed a yearly 
profit - sharing ceiling of 6,840 francs, or about $1,400)." 
In other cases, the law makes general provisions for reserve-creation and 
debt-redemption. Swedish companies, for instance, are required to contribute 
10 per cent of their profits to reserves until the reserve fund is equal 
to 20 per cent of the shareholders' capital, and to use a further 10 per cent 
for debt redemption as long as outstanding debts are greater than total 
equity capital. 
The remaining profits are used for reinvestment for the payment of 
dividends to the state, in accordance with decisions taken by the management 
of the companies themselves. Ceylon has a simpler system, which leaves 
the widest possible discretion to the relevant minister, acting on the advice 
of the enterprises' managements. According to the Industrial Corporation Act 
of 1957. 
/"Out of 
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"Out of the profits of the Corporation in each year the Board of 
Directors shall, with the approval of the Minister, pay to general 
or specific reserves of the Corporation such sums of money as may 
be determined by such board with such approval, and the balance, 
if any, of such profits shall with the approval of the Minister 
of Finance, be paid to the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury to 
be credited to the Consolidated Fund of Ceylon." 
There are yet other countries which, while making no general' legal 
regulations for the distribution of profits, applicable to every enterprise 
or to all enterprises falling within certain categories, embody special 
provisions within each enterprise's constituting law. Turkey is one of 
these - although she also has a law (Ho. 440) which, among other things, 
"foresees the payments of premiums and dividends from the net profits to 
the personnel who have played a role in increasing the productivity" of 
all her state economic enterprises. In Italy, the matter is entirely 
decided by the statute relating to the management agency concerned. 
The IRI, for instance, is required by its own law to contribute 20 per cent 
of its profits to a reserve fund, 15 per cent to vocational training, 
management training, and technical and social assistance, and 65 per cent 
to the State Treasury. 
The above analysis illustrates the enormous variety of practices 
governing profit distribution. Circumstances differ so widely that it would 
be foolhardy indeed to recommend any one system, or even group of systems, 
as the best. There seems however to be four general principles which.* should 
as far as possible be universally observed» Firstly, the pattern of profit-
distribution should be thought out in advance, and not left to a series 
of purely ad hoc decisions. Secondly, it should not be so rigid as to 
inhibit distribution in a manner conformable with the requirements of 
the national economy as a whole. Thirdly, it should give the maximum 
practicable freedom to the managements of the enterprises and contain 
provisions designed to provide both managers and workers with financial 
incentives for the improvement of their performance. Fourthly - and 
perhaps most importantly for the less developed countries - it should 




should be either "ploughed back" or used for purposes of general capital-
formation, We are aware, of course, that these principles are by no 
means complementary; indeed, they may frequently come into acute conflict 
with one another. What we are saying is simply that they should all 
be *>orne in mind by those who are entrusted with the making of decisions 
on this important subject. 
As to the actual effect of profits policy on the morale of both 
managers and workers, one must make a distinction between (a) the general 
effect deriving from the ability of the enterprise to show a profit and 
from its freedom to exercise some control over the use to which that profit 
is put; and (b) the specific effect arising from the distribution of some 
portion of the profit in the form of bonuses to its personnel. 
When an enterprise can claim that it is a venture that yields 
adequate returns to its founders and others, it tends to get favourable 
publicity. Moreover, a profitable enterprise is likely to be subject 
to less interference by the political and administrative authorities 
than an unprofitable one. Both of these factors obviously enhance the 
morale of the enterprise's managers, and it is even possible that some 
of the ordinary employees may begin to take a pride in the achievements 
of "their" concern. When profits have been genuinely "won", such 
reactions are fully justified.» It must always be remembered, however, 
that in a situation where the enterprise enjoys some degree of 
monopoly or is operating in a consistent seller's market, profits 
may be easy to obtain and hence offer no real criterion of efficiency. 
Such a situation, as we have seen, often prevails in the less developed 
countries. Both managers and workers, therefore, may be living in 
a fool's paradise. Indeed, profitability which has been obtained as 
a result of no particular effort may induce complacency rather than 
stimulate iniciative. As for management's freedom to use the profit that 
it makes - or at least a significant proportion of them - for its own self-
determined purposes, there is a general opinion — which we, on a priori 
/grounds, are 
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grounds, are inclined to endorse - that the greater the freedom accorded, 
the higher will be the morale. Clearly, managers cannot be accorded 
total freedom to dispose of their net profits. If an enterprise is not 
scheduled for further expansion, it would be simply unwise to allow 
them to pursue an indiscriminate policy of "ploughing back"; such a 
course would simply restrict the possibilities of capital-formation in 
those areas where it was really required, and would be incompatible with 
coherent national economic planning. On the other hand, it would at least 
seem to be inimical to managerial morale if all the fruits of success were 
arbitrarily taken away by higher authority, to be used - perhaps - for 
purposes which seemed to the managers themselves, to be of comparatively 
low priority. Perhaps the key word here is "arbitrarily", and it may 
be that what managers really want is not the right to dispose of the 
profits they have made but to be seriously consulted about the disposition 
of such profits. There is plenty of evidence that consultation does not 
always take place, or that when it does take place it is not always serious. 
Policy and practice in this field might well receive some further discussion. 
The specific effect of bonuses for personnel, fed from the 
enterprise's profits, is also the subject of some controversy. In theory, 
it should be good for morale; in practice it is not always so. When an 
enterprise enjoys a comparatively sheltered existence, the payment of 
bonuses out of regularly-accruing profits may settle down into a routine 
and the bonuses come to be regarded as a normal addition to standard 
wages and salaries. Equally serious is the situation where certain 
enterprises, through no particular effort of their own, are able to pay 
bonuses, whereas other enterprises, through no fault of their own, are 
unable to do so. In this case whatever stimulatory effect the bonus-paying 
regulations have on the first group of enterprise may be offset by the 
depressant effect on the second group. Similar considerations apply to the 
use of profits for the provision of profits for the provision of services 
in kind, such as housing and recreational facilities. Such services are 
provided on a fairly lavish scale in the Turkish state economic enterprises, 
but the Turkish rapporteur although noting their existence, has nothing to 
say about their effect as incentives or their impact on morale. 
/Much more 
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Much more useful, from this standpoint, is the payment of bonuses 
and provision of services based, not on profitability, but on productivity, 
both individual and collective! but this requires that there should be 
reasonably sophisticated means of measuring productivity and of apportioning 
responsibility for it. So far as workers are concerned, the simplest 
method is the introduction of piecework schemes; but whether this is 
possible depends both upon the nature of the enterprise's operations and 
the reactions of the workers to this particular form of remuneration, 
which differ from country to country and from industry to industry. 
In some countries, productivity bonuses of various kinds are paid 
in addition to profit-based bonuses. The French enterprises, for instance, 
have both profit-sharing schemes and "output" bonuses, individual and 
collective. Iraq also reports the supplementation of its legally-prescribed 
profit-sharing plan by what it describes as "additional remuneration for 
meritorious performance"; but does not explain precisely how "merit" is 
measured. What is obvious is that there is plenty of room for fruitful 
experiment and for interchange of different national experience in this 
field. 
Among other specific incentives is the introduction of schemes for 
worker participation in managerial functions, by way either of representation 
on decision-taking bodies or of membership of consultative committees. 
This is such a big and controversial subject that its adequate discussion 
would need a separate and very lengthy report. 
Here one can only record that the demand for "participation" seems 
to be growing everywhere; that most countries have equipped their public 
enterprises with some form of consultative machinery; and that a few 
have decided to involve the workers, usually through their trade unions, 
in actual managerial functions. Of the latter group, France has the 
longest experience of "participatory" practice. Ey her nationalization 
laws, dating from the period immediately following the Second World War, 
she established "tripartite" Boards of Directors on which the workers 
received representation. Turkey has recently introduced a similar type 
of participation. 
/With regard 
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. With regard to problems of measuring efficiency in public 
manufacturing enterprises, it has already been indicated that, profit, 
however calculated —'''fails to provide a meaningful yardstick except where 
competitive conditions prevail, which is rarely the case in the less 
developed countries. Even in the more developed it is rarely adopted 
as the sole criterion, France, which regards other tests of efficiency 
as "secondary", nevertheless admits that there are cases where the 
profitability criterion is "debateable" (e.g. when the state is the sole 
purchaser of the products of a public manufacturing enterprise) and where 
other criteria must be used (e.g. when the enterprise has as its main 
objective the trying out of certain technological innovations, or is 
striving to obtain a foothold in markets that are as yet potential rather 
than actual), 
Efficiency can be measured only in relation to defined objectives. 
As, in many countries, the objectives of public manufacturing enterprises 
have received no more than vague and ambiguous definition, any form of 
efficiency measurement may be a difficult exercise. Even where clear 
definition of objectives has been attempted, difficulties are likely to 
arise from the fact that many public manufacturing enterprises are expected 
to pursue "social" as well as purely commercial goals. The problem of 
giving each kind of goal its due emphasis is well illustrated by the 
document issued by the Bristish government in 1961, entitled "The Financial 
and Economic Objectives of the Nationalized Industries" which first defined 
the government's main task as that of ensuring "that the industries are 
1/ Different countries use different methods for the calculation of 
profitability, and some have as yet failed to standardize their 
methods. The method most normally used is net yield in relation . 
to total capital employed, expressed as a percentage. Some 
countries, however, use annual production costs as the 
denominator, and some use turnover. India, reports "no uniform 
practice", and the Sudanese rapporteur says that "no scientific 
method" is used, apparently on the ground that profitability is 
not regarded as an important criterion. Lack of detailed 
information prevents one from attempting to assess the advantages 
and disadvantages of the various methods. We would emphasize, 
however, the importance of the adoption of a common standard, within 
a particular country, if profitability is to be used as one of the 
criteria for comparing the performance of different enterprises. 
/organized and 
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organized and administered efficiently and economically to carry out 
their responsibilities, and that they are thus enabled to make the 
maximum contribution towards the economic well-being of the community 
as a whole", but then immediately added that "although the industries 
have obligations of a national and non-commercial kind, they are not, 
and ought not to be regarded as social services absolved from economic 
and commercial justification". From 1961 onwards an attempt was made 
to bridge this diehotony by setting five-yearly targets, expressed in 
terms of percentage return on total capital, which would take into 
consideration both the "commercial" and the "social" obligations of the 
industries concerned. Of recent years, however more sophisticated 
techniques have been developed, using the devices of Discounted Cash 
Flow (DCF) and cost-benefit calculations. These are useful both for 
choosing objectives and for defining them in quantitative terms. They 
also greatly facilitate the task of checking performance. But they by 
no means offer anything in the nature of automatic problem-solving devices. 
Once targets have been decided on, a whole battery of criteria are 
available to measure the economic efficiency with which a public 
manufacturing enterprise is striving to reach them. One will be interested 
in how economically the enterprise is using its capital resources and its 
inputs of raw materials, fuel and power; in what steps it is taking to 
save on overheads and inventories; in the results of its efforts - if any -
to raise the productivity of labour; and in the changes that are taking 
place in cost per unit of production of given quality. On the basis of 
these and other criteria, an efficiency "profile" of the enterprise may 
be built up over the years, and with its help weaknesses may be identified • 
and corrected. In the developed countries such criteria are being 
regularly employed; in the less developed countries they are often used, 
if at all, only fitfully and inexpertly. 
Governments are sometimes afraid to use them, because they do not 
wish to expose to public inspection the inefficiency of the enterprises for 
which they are responsible; but even in more favourable political 
Circumstances, knowledge of how to use them is often absent, except among 
the inadequate number of trained efficiency experts, usually concentrated in 
the central ministries rather than spread out among the enterprises themselves. 
/It is 
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It is therefore a matter of no surprise that reports from the 
less developed countries on "criteria for efficiency" tend to be rather 
vague, ifeny discussions specified "fulfilment of plan targets" and this 
indeed, is an objective as important as it is obvious. One is aware, however, 
that plan targets tend to be expressed in industry~by-industry figures for 
global, physical production. Unless these are broken down into specific 
assignments, both physical and financial, for each undertaking, they cannot 
offer even rough-and-ready criteria for the assessment of performance. 
Other criteria specified are "best use of resources", "output", "quality", 
"production costs", "prices'?, "meeting of demand", and "non-financial, 
social and economic objectives". Such a miscellaneous collection shows 
little more than that the governments concerned are in favour of virtue 
and against sin. They do not provide evidence of any attempt at precise 
definition of objectives or at precise measurement of the extent to which 
the objectives are being reached - although there is no doubt that such 
an attempt is actually being made, more vigorously in some countries than 
in others. 


